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Chapter 13: How Existing Environmental Laws  








Existing environmental laws interact with public health priorities and with aspects of the 
changing climate in numerous and varied ways. This chapter does not attempt to catalogue those 
interactions, but instead focuses on two that are especially important and illustrative of the 
operation and limitations of existing environmental laws vis-à-vis climate change-driven 
challenges. The first interaction is between pollution levels boosted by climate change and 
pollution control laws that employ health-based standards to determine pollution limits. The 
second is between a wider array of existing laws and the effects of climate change mitigation 
measures on public health. Examining these interactions reveals the inadequacy of existing laws 
to the tasks of 1) tracking the public health impacts of—much less adapting to—climate change, 
and 2) ensuring that climate change mitigation efforts reflect a rational accounting of impacts on 
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Existing environmental laws interact with public health priorities and with aspects of the 
changing climate in numerous and varied ways. This chapter does not attempt to catalogue those 
interactions, but instead focuses on two that are especially important and illustrative of the 
operation and limitations of existing environmental laws vis-à-vis climate change-driven 
challenges. The first interaction is between pollution levels boosted by climate change and 
pollution control laws that employ health-based standards to determine pollution limits. The 
second is between a wider array of existing laws and the effects of climate change mitigation 
measures on public health. Examining these interactions reveals the inadequacy of existing laws 
to the tasks of 1) tracking the public health impacts of—much less adapting to—climate change, 
and 2) ensuring that climate change mitigation efforts reflect a rational accounting of impacts on 
public health, whether from foregoing mitigation or undertaking it. 
I. Pollution control statutes: climate change and the amplification of public 
health impacts  
As climate change alters the pathways through which pollution arrives at points of 
contact with people, it often causes the same volume of released pollution to result in a higher 
degree of human exposure. For instance, the same volume of agricultural runoff will generate 
more—and more virulent—algae in warmer water.
1
 The case is similar for ozone, which forms 
more readily from the same quantity of precursors amid higher ambient air temperatures. Thus, 
as the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s assessment of climate change and health 
concludes: “Climate change will make it harder for any given regulatory approach to reduce 
ground-level ozone pollution in the future as meteorological conditions become increasingly 
conducive to forming ozone over most of the United States.”
2
 The report also points out the clear 
and unavoidable implication of this trend: “Unless offset by additional emissions reductions, 
these climate-driven increases in ozone will cause premature deaths, hospital visits, lost school 
days, and acute respiratory symptoms.”
3
 But pollution control statutes will not automatically 
effectuate those offsetting reductions, whether in relation to ozone formation or other forms of 
                                                 
1
 See Rob Herman, Toxic Algae Blooms Are on the Rise, Scientific American (Blog), Sept. 7, 2016, 
https://perma.cc/5D3U-FMF2; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now 
What?, Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate, & Env't 9, 28–31 (2009) (“if waters are warming because of both climate 
change impacts and discharges of heated effluent, reducing the point source discharges may forestall the worst 
effects of increasing temperatures and hence increase the resilience of the species and ecosystems in those waters.”). 
2
 U.S. Global Change Research Program, Climate and Health Assessment, Key Finding 1: Exacerbated Ozone 
Health Impacts, https://health2016.globalchange.gov/air-quality-impacts#finding-42 (emphasis added). 
3
 Id. 
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pollution. Indeed, it is unlikely that they will even signal clearly that such reductions are 
necessary to maintain the current public health status quo.
4
  
With the exception of the Endangered Species Act, which focuses on the protection of 
other species, environmental protection statutes—and certainly all pollution control statutes—
make their basic objective the protection of public health and welfare. Pollution control statutes, 
however, apply different standards to the protections they impose.
5
 Under the Clean Air Act, for 
instance, standards fall into three categories. Some are set using a cost-benefit analysis that 
balances public health risks against polluters’ costs. Others are set based on “feasibility,” 
meaning that polluters must use whatever pollution control technologies have been shown to be 
both maximally effective and not so expensive as to drive an industry into bankruptcy. Still 
others—of particular interest in this chapter—are “health-based,” meaning that they are to reflect 
the level of pollution that research has identified as safe for humans to encounter in the ambient 
environment.  
A limit prescribed by this third category starts with a fixed value, often derived from 
dose-response or concentration-response curves that measure the correlation between the risk of 
a particular adverse health outcome and increasing levels of exposure to a particular pollutant.
6
 
Levels of risk on a dose-response curve are sensitive to the concentration of a given pollutant and 
the status of the human exposed to it (e.g., child, immuno-compromised, pregnant, exercising
7
), 
but are generally abstracted from circumstances at the point of exposure, like the ambient air 
temperature. In addition to this fixed, abstract value, pollution limits also incorporate factors that 
reflect how the pollution at issue enters, travels through, and persists in the ambient environment. 
While climate change does not affect the fixed value, it does alter the dynamic ones.
8
 
A. Two examples of health-based standards amid a changing climate 
The following examples—the Clean Air Act’s regulation of ground-level ozone and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s regulation of coastal hazardous waste transfer and 




                                                 
4
 At least one commentator goes a step farther, arguing that the environmental impacts of climate change will both 
exacerbate pollution and dampen public support for effective environmental regulation. Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting 
to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34 Ecology L.Q. 61, 65 (2007). 
5
 Congressional Research Service, Cost and Benefit Considerations in Clean Air Act Regulations 3–7 (May 2017), 
https://perma.cc/YMH9-DVF6 (listing statutory provisions that instruct, permit, or prohibit the Administrator from 
taking cost into account when setting a particular standard). 
6
 See, e.g., EPA, Integrated Science Assessment of Ozone and Related Photochemical Oxidants 2-32 to 2-34 (2013). 
7
 Id. at 5-18 to 5-19 (discussing effects of activity); 5-64 to 5-67 (discussing effects of lifestage). 
8
 See P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 5863 Science 573–74 (Feb. 2008) 
(discussing disruptive effects of climate change on models that inform water policy). 
9
 See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 San Diego J. Climate & Energy 
L. 259, 266 (2009) (“climate impacts might be managed in part through current federal law.”). 
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1. Ground-level ozone under the Clean Air Act 
Ground-level ozone does not emerge from smoke stacks or tailpipes, but rather forms 
when nitrogen oxide (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs)—which do emerge from 
smoke stacks or tailpipes—comingle in the presence of sunlight or another heat source.
10
 Thus, 
even if levels of NOx and VOCs remained flat in the coming decades, ozone’s prevalence in the 
ambient air would likely grow as average temperatures rise across the U.S.
11
 Notably, over the 
past several decades, levels of ozone in the ambient air have fallen far less than other pollutants 
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.
12
 
The Clean Air Act directs EPA and the various states to take a series of regulatory steps 
with respect to ground-level ozone.
13
 The first is adoption by EPA of a National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard (NAAQS)—a health-based limit above which concentrations of ground-level 
ozone in the ambient air have been shown to do harm to public health and welfare.
14
 To 
determine that limit, EPA seeks the advice of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee 
(CASAC), which evaluates available scientific evidence and issues recommendations about 
where the limit should fall and how to measure compliance with it.
15
 The Clean Air Act, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, directs EPA to treat ozone as a “non-threshold contaminant,” 
meaning that the NAAQS for ozone can theoretically be set to zero.
16
 Once the NAAQS is set, 
other components of the Clean Air Act’s machinery make it a national yardstick: areas where 
ozone concentrations do not exceed it are in “attainment,” and those few areas where ozone 
concentrations do exceed it are in “nonattainment.”
17
 (See Figure 1.) 
                                                 
10
 EPA, Ozone Pollution: Ozone Basics, https://perma.cc/3EEW-2ZKZ (updated Apr. 5, 2017). 
11
 See, e.g., Perry E. Sheffield et al., Modeling of Regional Climate Change Effects on Ground-Level Ozone and 
Childhood Asthma, 41 Am. J. Preventive Med. 251, 255 (2011), https://perma.cc/93RP-W2YP (estimating increases 
in emergency room visits to treat acute episodes of pediatric asthma due to effects of climate change on ozone 
formation). 
12
 EPA, Air Trends: Air Quality-Trends and Summary, https://perma.cc/SA4C-QNCR (last updated July 26, 2017). 
13
 EPA, Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, https://perma.cc/8ZRK-FW7F (last 
updated Dec. 1, 2016). 
14
 See Clean Air Act §§ 108, 109; 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.09 (primary ozone NAAQS), 50.10 (secondary). 
15
 Clean Air Act § 109(d)(2) (establishing independent scientific review committee to recommend new or updated 
NAAQS to EPA Administrator); EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC): Charter, 
https://perma.cc/E5UA-UTFL (visited June 9, 2017); see also Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) of Ozone and 
Related Photochemical Oxidants (Final Report, Feb 2013): History/Chronology (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4JZN-V6JY; EPA, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,172, 11,172 (Feb. 15, 2013) (describing steps of ozone NAAQS 
development involving CASAC). But see also Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-
Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1184 (2014) (criticizing EPA’s approach to deriving nominally 
health-based NAAQS in a way that manifestly but secretly takes non-health factors into account). 
16
 See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns (2001) (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (July 18, 1997) and 61 Fed. Reg. 65,637, 
65,651 (1996)). Livermore and Revesz have pointed out that EPA does not actually adhere to the logic of a “non-
threshold” health-based standard with respect to all non-threshold pollutants and often adopts limits that reflect other 
considerations as well. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental 
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1184, 1188–89, 1246 (Oct. 2014). 
17
 40 C.F.R. § 51.491 (defining “attainment area” and “nonattainment area”). 
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As Figure 1 shows, there are gradations of nonattainment, ranging from marginal to extreme. 
Different rules apply to sources of pollutants that generate ozone precursors in attainment and 
nonattainment areas; the rules governing nonattainment areas reflect the extremity of each area’s 
noncompliance.
19
 Perhaps most importantly for this chapter’s purposes, in nonattainment areas, 
major new or modified emitting facilities may only receive a permit to pollute if they 
demonstrate that they will achieve the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate, which the Clean Air 
Act defines as either the most stringent emission limitation prescribed by any state for that 
source category, or the most stringent limitation actually achieved by that source category.
20
 
Actually dealing with sources of ozone precursors is a task for the state agencies that 
update and enforce compliance with State Implementation Plans (SIPs), and for the state 
attorneys general who seek to enforce compliance by other states with the Cross State Air 
Pollution Rule’s restrictions on emissions that make downwind state’s compliance with their 
own SIPs more difficult.
21
 While states operate with guidance and subject to EPA oversight,
22
 
their approaches are not mechanistic, even with respect to measuring pollution levels, which has 
been shown to be strategic: in marginal areas, the strategy aims to avoid thresholds for a higher 
                                                 
18
 U.S. EPA Green Book, https://perma.cc/X3V3-KNS5 (updated Sept. 30, 2017; showing areas designated 
nonattainment by EPA as of June 20, 2017). 
19
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515 (prescribing state implementation plan requirements for nonattainment areas); id. § 
7511d (imposing fines on exceedence of prescribed limits in severe or extreme nonattainment areas). 
20
 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3). 
21
 See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Maryland v. Pruitt, 1:17-cv-02873-JKB (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2017) 
(alleging that NOx emissions from at least 36 power plants in upwind states constitute a violation of the Clean Air 
Act’s “good neighbor” provision). 
22
 See EPA, Technology Transfer Network / NAAQS Ozone Implementation: Related Documents and Data, 
https://archive.epa.gov/ttn/ozone/web/html/related-3.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2016) (collecting federal guidance 
and state-submitted documents). 
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 Similarly, state-level action to address pollution does not follow 




2. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and coastal hazardous waste facilities 
“[The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)]’s primary purpose . . . is to 
reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and 
disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future 
threat to human health and the environment.’”
25
 To accomplish this goal, which expressly 
contemplates future circumstances but says nothing about climate change, RCRA imposes 
various requirements on the entities involved in managing solid or hazardous wastes.
26
 Some of 
those requirements relate to the detailed tracking of wastes, which in turn facilitates 
identification of instances of “release,” i.e., failures to prevent those wastes from migrating out 
of the containers, tanks, or impoundments used to transport, store, or dispose of them. Other 
requirements relate to facility design and management; as New Jersey’s Department of 
Environmental Protection summarizes, a RCRA permit “outlines facility design and operation, 
lays out safety standards, and describes activities that the facility must perform, such as 
monitoring and reporting.  Permits typically require facilities to develop emergency plans, find 
insurance and financial backing, and train employees to handle hazards.”
27
 
Much as rising temperatures promise to generate more ground-level ozone from the same 
volume of NOx and VOCs, rising sea levels promise to heighten the prospective risk of release at 
coastal hazardous waste facilities due to various forms of flooding—risks illustrated dramatically 
by Hurricane Harvey’s inundation of multiple facilities near Houston.
28
 And, much as the Clean 
Air Act sets forth fixed pollutant concentration standards based on human health impacts, RCRA 
establishes a standard that is also based on human health and would seem to transcend particular 
                                                 
23
 Corbett Grainger et al., How States Comply with Federal Regulations: Strategic Ambient Pollution Monitoring 
(Oct. 2016), https://perma.cc/A4WP-JH3L (finding that state and local authorities place monitoring stations 
strategically to affect results). 
24
 Jinghui Lim, The impact of monitoring and enforcement on air pollutant emissions, 49 J. Reg'y Econ. 203, 220 
(Apr. 2016), https://perma.cc/7LQ3-VC7U (identifying deterrent effect from different levels of penalties imposed by 
state agencies on NOx emitters);  EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA and States Not Making Sufficient Progress 
in Reducing Ozone Precursor Emissions in Some Major Metropolitan Areas, Report No. 2004-P-00033 (Sept. 29, 
2004). 
25
 Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et 
seq. 
26
 RCRA § 3019, 42 U.S.C. § 6939a(a) (requiring applicant seeking a permit for new landfill or surface 
impoundment facility that will contain hazardous waste to submit an assessment of public exposure from 
“reasonably foreseeable potential releases” that are “related to the unit.”). 
27
 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Waterfront Permitting Made Simple (or at Least Simpler): 
The Guide to New York City and New Jersey Waterfront Permitting, https://perma.cc/7F62-GNNV (accessed June 
12, 2017). 
28
 Ralph Vartabedian, Harvey pounded the nation's chemical epicenter. What's in the foul-smelling floodwater left 
behind?, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 2017, https://perma.cc/MY5G-8R24. 
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environmental circumstances. However, the differences between the two statutes’ health-related 
standards are significant as well. Whereas the Clean Air Act bases source-specific pollution 
limits on the numbers and testing protocols specified in a NAAQS, RCRA articulates its health-
related basic standard not as a numeric threshold, but in its definition of entities potentially 
subject to a citizen suit:  
any past or present generator, . . .  transporter, or . . . owner or operator of a 
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing 
to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of 
any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial 




Because various courts’ applications of this standard give it meaning, the “threshold” it provides 
for separating compliant from noncompliant conduct is sometimes fuzzy and frequently 
contested—especially the terms emphasized with italics above.  
In the context of rising sea levels and encroaching shorelines, does this definition 
effectively require coastally-sited permit holders to adapt or else be found to be the source of 
imminent and substantial endangerments to the health of nearby individuals and communities? 
The case, Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil, which has survived a motion to dismiss 
as of September 2017,
30
 addresses this question in the context of the Everett Terminal, a coastal 
petroleum transfer and storage facility located near Boston. CLF asserts that downscaled climate 
models make clear that the facility is already vulnerable to flooding in ways that ExxonMobil 
has not addressed.
31
 ExxonMobil responds that it complies with the requirements of the facility’s 
permit—which does not expressly contemplate climate change impacts—and therefore cannot be 
in violation of RCRA.
32
 Because the basic RCRA standard at issue is not a pollution 
concentration threshold against which compliance can be measured with precision, resolution by 
the courts will be based on a legal analysis as well as—and possibly more so than—empirical 
measurements. 
B. Pollution control laws and stationarity   
Climate change is replacing stable historical environmental baselines with dynamic ones. 
This point is almost a tautology, but it does not guarantee that those responsible for enforcing 
environmental laws will abandon the premise of environmental stationarity that tacitly informs 
                                                 
29
 RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
30
 Order, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. et al., C.A. No. 1:16-cv-11950-MLW (D. Mass. 
Sept. 13, 2017). 
31
 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., C.A. No. 1:16-cv-11950-MLW (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2016). 
32
 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., C.A. No. 1:16-cv-11950-MLW (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 2016). 
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most pollution control laws.
33
 As the examples discussed above show, mere evidence of 
stationarity’s obsolescence is not enough. Strong signals that existing pollution control will 
become increasingly ineffective without more stringent and aggressive enforcement have not 
(yet) altered the approaches taken by federal and state agencies to applying existing 
environmental laws to pollution in a changing environmental context. This is understandable in 
so far as law enforcement takes direction from policy makers; if policy makers in agencies 
ignore—or are prevented from acting on—those signals, a course correction will only come from 
accumulated courtroom defeats or legislation. 
The still-unresolved questions of whether and how GHG emissions are to be regulated 
under the Clean Air Act hint at what we can expect of the coming fights—like CLF v. 
ExxonMobil—over applying environmental laws in ways that respond to changing environmental 
conditions. The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA started the wheels of 
the Clean Air Act turning,
34
 but now, more than 10 years later, U.S. political leaders dispute the 
scientific consensus underlying that decision and have debated internally how best to apply the 
Act so as to avoid regulating GHG emissions with any material effect.
35
 This persistent political 
ambivalence over climate change mitigation policy does not augur well for the application of 
existing environmental laws—directly or indirectly—to effectuate adaptation goals. This is not 
only because it demonstrates political leaders and policy makers’ willingness to ignore evidence, 
but also and no less importantly because causation in the adaptation context is less 
straightforward than in the context of mitigation: dozens of noisy factors accompany the signal 
of a warmer climate amplifying the contribution of pollution precursors to human exposure to 
pollution. Thus, while environmental laws can be expected to be a source of partial information 
as the climate changes, environmental enforcement agencies’ understanding and application of 
those laws should not be expected to evolve without conscious intervention at least by regulatory 
policy makers and likely, eventually, by legislators as well. 
II. Public health co-benefits and co-harms of climate change mitigation 
measures 
Positive and negative public health impacts can be expected to result from mitigation 
efforts,
36
 but the scales are not balanced: mitigation is likely to yield far more positive public 
health impacts than negative ones. Current law credits only some of the positive impacts and 
fails to anticipate or avoid many of the negative ones. This section considers several likely public 
                                                 
33
 See P.C.D. Milly et al., supra note 8;. 
34
 594 U.S. 497 (2007). 
35
 Andrew Resuccia & Alex Guillen, Pruitt takes fire from conservatives in climate showdown, Politico, Mar. 28, 
2017, https://perma.cc/K53Q-ZHBR (describing debate among climate skeptics within EPA over tactical efficacy of 
trying to rescind the 2009 endangerment finding on which mitigation under the Clean Air Act is based). 
36
 Kirk R. Smith et al., Energy and Human Health, 34 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 159 (Mar. 2013), DOI: 
10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031912-114404. 
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health impacts of mitigation—co-benefits first, then co-harms—and describes how the law takes 
them into account.  
Before considering examples of co-benefits and co-harms from mitigation, it is important 
to first note that this chapter borrows from the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project for its 
vision of the potential scale and scope of mitigation efforts in the United States over the coming 
decades.
37
 That vision entails large investments in energy efficiency, the electrification of the 
transportation and building sectors, and the near-total replacement of fossil-fueled electricity 
generation with renewable and non-emitting sources.
38
 Putting this borrowed vision in the 
background of this chapter clarifies the degree of mitigation currently thought possible without 
basic disruptions to the economy and society. This in turn anticipates (and refutes) the suggestion 
that because fossil fuels have played an important role historically in improving public health it 
is not possible to decouple future economic and societal development—and concomitant 
improvements to public health—from reliance on fossil fuels.  
A further preliminary note relates to this chapter’s geographic focus on the U.S., which 
has important implications for the types of climate mitigation co-benefits and co-harms 
considered herein.
39
 Some forms of mitigation have very different public health implications in 
the U.S. as compared to the developing world. An especially clear example is the climate and 
public health tradeoff related to air conditioning (AC). As a changing climate leads to warmer 
average temperatures and more frequent and intense heat waves, access to AC will become 
increasingly important to public health outcomes (see Chapter 7). Most AC units currently rely 
on the compression of fluorinated gases (F-gases) to generate cool air.
40
 Unfortunately, f-gases’ 
extremely large global warming potential (GWP) co-efficients make them a threat to climate 
stability.
41
 AC is widely available in those parts of the U.S. that experience hot weather, but not 





                                                 
37
 See J.H. Williams et al. Pathways to deep decarbonization in the United States: The U.S. report of the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways; Project of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network and the Institute for 
Sustainable Development and International Relations (Nov. 2015), https://perma.cc/92LD-G6VN (describing 
pathways by which the U.S. could reduce its annual GHG emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050). 
38
 Id. at vii. 
39
 See, e.g., Damilola Olawuyi, Climate justice and corporate responsibility: taking human rights seriously in 
climate actions and projects, 34 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 1-18 (2016) (describing adverse impacts of climate 
mitigation projects); Damilola Olawuyi, Fostering Accountability in Large Scale Environmental Projects: Lessons 
from CDM and REDD+ Projects, in Improving Delivery in Development: The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and 
Accountability 127–47 (J Wouters et al. eds. 2015). 
40
 O. Abdelaziz, W. Goetzler et al., The Future of Air Conditioning for Buildings (July 2016), 
https://perma.cc/959T-JJKD. 
41
 See Pallav Purohit and Lena Höglund-Isaksson, Global emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases 2005–2050 
with abatement potentials and costs, 17  Atmos. Chem. Phys. 2795, 2804 (2017) (estimating changes in f-gas 
emissions by region under different scenarios). 
42
 Michael Wehner et al., The Deadly Combination of Heat and Humidity in India and Pakistan in Summer 2015, in 
Explaining Extreme Events of 2015 from a Climate Perspective, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 
97(12) s81–s86 (Stephanie C. Herring et al. eds. Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/E4KX-AAYT;  
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the acute health-related dangers of heat without recourse to artificial means of cooling.
44
 In the 
coming decades, greater spending power combined with growing numbers of hot days in 
developing countries is expected to drive huge volumes of AC sales.
45
 This will, on the one 
hand, provide greater protection for public health vis-à-vis heat hazards. On the other hand, 
however, it will potentially drive a large increase in the release of F-gases into the atmosphere. 
Thus, whereas an aggressive program of climate mitigation might call for restrictions on the use 
of AC reliant on F-gases in the U.S. and elsewhere, such restrictions would impose significant 
co-harms on public health in large swathes of the developing world. 
A. Co-benefits of mitigation 
This part briefly describes two examples of climate change mitigation efforts that would 
yield significant public health co-benefits. It follows that description with a discussion of the 
limited and inconsistent ways in which the law recognizes such co-benefits. 
1.  Reducing fossil fuel use 
Material threats to public health have been identified in relation to the air and water 
pollution resulting from nearly all aspects of getting at and using fossil fuels: coal mining,
46
 the 
“conventional” drilling and exploitation of land-based and off-shore oil deposits
47
 and wells 
                                                                                                                                                             
43
 Tom Kosatsky, The 2003 European Heat Waves, Eurosurveillance (noting estimate of 22,080 excess deaths amid 
2003 heatwaves in Europe); Stephen Whitman et al., Mortality in Chicago attributed to the July 1995 heat wave, 
American Journal of Public Health 87(9) 1515-18 (1997), https://perma.cc/R6SD-VBGE. 
44
 Yan Wang et al., Heat stroke admissions during heat waves in 1,916 US counties for the period from 1999 to 
2010 and their effect modifiers, Environmental Health 15:83 (Aug. 2016) (identifying correlation between access to 
central AC and lower rates of hospitalization during heat waves). 
45
 O. Abdelaziz, W. Goetzler et al., The Future of Air Conditioning for Buildings (July 2016), 
https://perma.cc/959T-JJKD. 
46
 Mountaintop removal mining (MTR) is notoriously polluting of the air and water around the mountains that it 
transforms into flattened moonscapes; however, a National Academies panel has been convened to resolve ongoing 
disputes about the public health impacts of that pollution by assessing the quality of existing studies and to identify 
what research questions remain open. Stephen Lee, Evidence Thin That Mountaintop Mining Harms Health: Coal 
Groups, BloombergBNA Daily Environment Report, Jul 19, 2017 (“On July 11, a National Academy of Sciences 
panel heard evidence from researchers broadly connecting mountaintop removal mining to higher rates of heart 
disease, cardiovascular disease, stroke, and death. . . . However, the researchers who presented their work also 
repeatedly stressed that the data are still too thin and that more study is needed.”); see also National Toxicology 
Program, Mountaintop Removal Mining: Impacts on Health in the Surrounding Community (last updated Nov. 16, 
2016), http://bit.ly/2tdDESl (for list of studies on adverse public health impacts of MTR in Central Appalachia, 
follow link to “Included and Excluded Studies (Updated Nov. 16, 2016)” spreadsheet and select “Included (n=37)” 
tab).  
47
 Impacts are especially severe in less developed countries with weaker regulatory regimes. See Cristina 
O’Callaghan-Gordo et al., Health effects of non-occupational exposure to oil extraction, Environmental Health 
15:56 (2016) , https://perma.cc/WW8Z-U4VR. Impacts of off-shore drilling arise chiefly from spills or occupational 
exposures. L.C. Peres et al., The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and physical health among adult women in southern 
Louisiana: the Women and Their Children’s Health (WaTCH) study, 124 Environmental Health Perspectives 1208–
1213 (2016), https://perma.cc/X65W-WKUB; Blanca Laffon et al., Effects of exposure to oil spills on human health: 
Updated review, Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part B 19:105-28 (2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10937404.2016.1168730; Jo S. Stenehjem et al., Self-reported Occupational Exposures 
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using “unconventional” high volume hydrofracture drilling;
48
 gas and oil refining;
49
 the 
transportation of coal via train,
50











 and, of course, the combustion of fossil fuels, whether by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Relevant for Cancer among 28,000 Offshore Oil Industry Workers Employed between 1965 and 1999, Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 12:458-68 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2014.989358. 
48
 Shaina L. Stacy, A Review of the Human Health Impacts of Unconventional Natural Gas Development, 4 Current 
Epidemiology Reports 38–45, (Mar. 2017); Nancy E. Lauer et al., Brine Spills Associated with Unconventional Oil 
Development in North Dakota, Environ. Sci. Technol. 2016, 50, 5389−5397; New York State Department of Health, 
A Public Health Review of High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing for Shale Gas Development (Dec. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/X2KB-XYXQ (describing identified adverse air and water quality impacts, and concluding that 
there is too much uncertainty about fracking’s potential public health impacts to allow it in New York); Maryland 
Institute for Applied Environmental Health, Potential Public Health Impacts of Natural Gas Development and 
Production in the Marcellus Shale in Western Maryland 26–83 (July 2014), https://perma.cc/X2KB-XYXQ (listing 
“community impacts” and “occupational impacts”). 
49
 Emmanuelle Lavaine & Matthew Neidell, Energy Production and Health Externalities: Evidence from Oil 
Refinery Strikes in France, 4 Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 447-77 (Apr. 
2017), https://perma.cc/74R6-78B5; Michael T. Kleinman et al., Emissions from oil and gas operations in the 
United States and their air quality implications, 66 Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association 1165-70 
(2016), https://perma.cc/HRW7-5FGP. 
50
 Multnomah County Health Department, The Human Health Effects of Rail Transport of Coal Through 
Multnomah County, Oregon: A Health Analysis and Recommendations for Further Action (Feb. 2013), 
https://perma.cc/3JAC-Q3AB. 
51
 Melissa Genereux et al., Two years after the train derailment: Lac-Megantic (Quebec, Canada) residents are still 
suffering, Eur J Public Health (2016) 26:207-08 (suppl_1), ; Ann Hayward Walker et al., Consensus Ecological Risk 
Assessment of Potential Transportation-related Bakken and Dilbit Crude Oil Spills in the Delaware Bay Watershed, 
USA, 4 Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 23, tbl. 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/29MG-9GN8 (listing incidents 
of spills of Bakken or Dilbit crude from railways between 2010 and 2014). 
52
 Heon Lee Cheol et al., Acute Health Effects of the Hebei Oil Spill on the Residents of Taean, Korea, J Prev Med 
Public Health. 2010;43(2):166-173, https://perma.cc/GZ3H-8K3U; Gina M. Solomon & Sarah Janssen, Health 
Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill, 304(10) JAMA 1118-19 (Sept. 2010), https://perma.cc/SWN2-W6LM. 
53
 Romany M. Webb, Safety First, Environment Last: Improving Regulation of Gas Pipeline Leaks, KBH Center for 
Energy, Law & Business, Research Paper No. 2015-14 (Sept. 2015), http://bit.ly/2tjmjU8 (noting prevalence of 
leaks and explosions in aging U.S. gas transmission and distribution infrastructure); Elizabeth Douglass, Two Years 
After Exxon's Mayflower Spill, Will Tougher Pipeline Rules Go Beyond Talk?, InsideClimate News, Mar. 30, 2015, 
https://perma.cc/SE76-N63S; Ayana R. Anderson, CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), Health 
Effects of Cut Gas Lines and Other Petroleum Product Release Incidents — Seven States, 2010–2012, June 12, 2015 
/ 64(22);601-605, https://perma.cc/2LK5-KDRJ. 
54
 Nathaniel Rich, The Invisible Catastrophe, N.Y.T. Mag., March 31, 2016, https://perma.cc/GG9U-Y22W (“In 
November, readings taken by SoCalGas near its facility found benzene concentrations fluctuating wildly between 
0.3 p.p.b. and a nightmarish 30.6; readings taken by the company in Porter Ranch shot as high as 5.5 p.p.b.”); Drew 
R. Michanowicz et al., A national assessment of underground natural gas storage: identifying wells with designs 
likely vulnerable to a single-point-of-failure, 12 Environmental Research Letters 064004 (May 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7G23-NA73. 
55
 Markus Hilpert et al., Hydrocarbon Release During Fuel Storage and Transfer at Gas Stations: Environmental 
and Health Effects, Current Environmental Health Reports (Dec. 2015) 2(4) 412–422, https://perma.cc/MG59-
YCR5; Vicky Huppé et al., Residential proximity to gasoline service stations and preterm birth, 20 Envtl. Sci. & 
Pollution Res. 7186 (Oct. 2013), doi:10.1007/s11356-013-1677-y. 
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industrial facilities, for electricity generation, or in vehicles.
56
 The mechanisms through which 
these activities expose people to pollutants are numerous and varied, but generally fall into three 
categories: pollutants that reduce local or regional air quality;
57
 toxic pollutants initially emitted 
by smokestacks that are deposited in watersheds and from there enter drinking water supplies 
and food chains;
58
 and pollutants introduced directly into surface or subsurface waters.
59
  
The practical task of estimating these co-benefits is facilitated by several factors. Legally 
mandated pollution controls have called into being sophisticated techniques and technologies for 
tracking pollution levels, and the measurable volumes of—and predictable relationships 
among—GHG and non-GHG pollutants make it relatively easy to extrapolate the ultimate effects 
of non-GHG emissions reductions that would follow from GHG emissions reductions.
60
 
Similarly, the pathways through which non-GHG air pollution burdens public health have been 
studied extensively.
61
 Furthermore, EPA generally estimates the costs and benefits of proposed 
air quality standards, even when the Clean Air Act directs that such estimates should not inform 
                                                 
56
 Heidi Vreeland et al., Oxidative Potential Of PM2.5 During Atlanta Rush Hour: Measurements Of In-Vehicle 
Dithiothreitol (DTT) Activity, 165 Atmospheric Environment 169–78 (2017) (in-vehicle PM2.5 samples collected 
during rush hour exceeded concentrations of particulates measured on roadsides); Frederica P. Perera, Multiple 
Threats to Child Health from Fossil Fuel Combustion: Impacts of Air Pollution and Climate Change, Envtl. Health 
Perspectives (June 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/EHP299 (“The data summarized here show that by sharply 
reducing our dependence on fossil fuels we would achieve highly significant health and economic benefits for our 
children and their future.”); Ryan Wise et al., The Environmental and Public Health Benefits of Achieving High 
Penetration of Solar Energy in the United States (May 2016), https://perma.cc/94PW-ZSG2; L. Noel & R. 
McCormack, A cost benefit analysis of a V2G-capable electric school bus compared to a traditional diesel school 
bus, Appl Energy, 126 (2014), pp. 246-255 (estimating public health benefits from lower levels of air pollution. 
57
 American Lung Association, State of the Air 2017, at 32-40 (2017) (providing overview of adverse health effects 
of exposure to particulate matter and ozone); G.F. Nemet et al., Implications of Incorporating Air-Quality 
CoBenefits into Climate Change Policymaking, Environmental Research Letters 5:19 (2010). 
58
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-08/coal-plants-might-be-even-more-toxic-than-we-thought; 
Adeline R. Lopez et al., Coal Ash Constituents at the Base of Aquatic Food Webs: Processes Affecting 
Bioaccumulation and Trophic Transfer, UNC Water Resources Research Inst. Rep. No. 465 (May 2016) (tracing 
arsenic from coal-fired power plants through aquatic food chains); EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial- Commercial- Institutional, and Small Industrial- Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, (Feb. 16, 2012) (“up to 29 percent of modeled watersheds 
have populations potentially at-risk from exposure to [mercury] from U.S. EGUs.”). 
59
 William D. Burgos et al., Watershed-Scale Impacts from Surface Water Disposal of Oil and Gas Wastewater in 
Western Pennsylvania, 51 Environ. Sci. Technol. 8851 (2017), (reporting on pollutants introduced into Pennsylvania 
surface waters after treatment of hydrofracture backflow by treatment facilities); Jennifer S. Harkness et al., 
Evidence for Coal Ash Ponds Leaking in the Southeastern United States, 50 Environ. Sci. Technol. 6583−6592 
(2016) https://perma.cc/MM9R-2TCW; Amrika Deonarine et al., Environmental Impacts of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Kingston Coal Ash Spill. 2. Effect of Coal Ash on Methylmercury in Historically Contaminated River 
Sediments, 47 Environ. Sci. Technol. 2100−2108 (2013), https://perma.cc/WVS7-Z873.  
60
 See Justin V. Remais et al., Estimating the Health Effects of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Strategies: Addressing 
Parametric, Model, and Valuation Challenges, 122 Environ Health Perspect. 447–455 (May 2015). 
61
 See, e.g., Philip J. Landrigan, Air pollution and health, The Lancet: Public Health 2(1) e4-e5 (Jan. 2017) (“Air 
pollution is one of the great killers of our age.”); Frank J. Kelly & Julia C. Fussell, Air pollution and public health: 
emerging hazards and improved understanding of risk, Environmental Geochemistry & Health. 2015; 37(4): 631–
649. 
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the agency’s decision about a particular standard.
62
 Of course, debate persists over the nature and 
extent of adverse public health impacts attributable to some of the activities listed above.
63
 
Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that public health co-benefits would accrue from the reduced 
exposures to conventional and toxic pollutants that would follow from reducing the extraction, 
transportation, and consumption of fossil fuels.
64
 
2.  Improving agricultural nitrogen use efficiency 
To grow, crops need reactive nitrogen, which is naturally scarce (unreactive nitrogen is 
abundant, but not useful to plants).
65
 Historically, the availability of naturally occurring reactive 
nitrogen was a limiting factor for crop growth;
66
 the synthesis of nitrogen fertilizers thus marked 
a crucial advance in agricultural technology.
67
 Demand for synthetic nitrogen fertilizers is now 
endemic to agriculture,
68
 as is the excessive provision of those fertilizers on land under 
cultivation.
69
 Excess reactive nitrogen that is spread on croplands often becomes a pollutant. As 
nitrate (NO3) it does the following: contaminates drinking water aquifers and causes 
acidification, hypoxia (oxygen depletion), as well as the eutrophication that feeds harmful algae 
blooms in coastal and lake ecosystems.
70
 As nitrous oxide (N2O), it depletes stratospheric 
ozone
71
 and is a potent greenhouse gas—298 times more potent than CO2.
72
 These harmful 
                                                 
62
 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 13, at 1188 n.13. 
63
 See, e.g., Madelon L. Finkel & Jake Hays, Environmental and health impacts of ‘fracking’: why epidemiological 
studies are necessary, 70 Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 221-22 (2016), https://perma.cc/98NF-
A82G (observing that existing studies of public health impacts are inconclusive, partly due to the long latency 
periods of adverse medical outcomes from exposures likely to result from proximity to drilling). 
64
 Andy Haines, Health co-benefits of climate action, The Lancet Planetary Health 1(1) e4-e5 (Apr. 2017) 
(collecting and summarizing studies); Fernando Garcia-Menendez et al., U.S. Air Quality and Health Benefits from 
Avoided Climate Change under Greenhouse Gas Mitigation, 49 Environ. Sci. Technol. 7580–7588, 7586 (2015) 
https://perma.cc/4RE8-BJVB (identifying significant benefits to air quality from the mitigation of climate change 
even ignoring accompanying reductions in ozone and PM pollution levels). This chapter does not attempt to answer 
the larger question of whether and under what conditions net public health benefits would follow from the reduction 
and substitution of fossil fuel use. See notes 20 & 21, supra, and accompanying text.  
65
 Unreactive nitrogen (N2) makes up much of the Earth’s atmosphere. Reactive nitrogen takes several forms, 
including nitrate (NO3), ammonia (NH3), and nitrous oxide (N2O). 
66




 See UN Food and Agriculture Organization, World fertilizer trends and outlook to 2019: Summary Report 7 
(2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5627e.pdf (tabulating world demand for nitrogen fertilizer by region). 
69
 Allen G. Good & Perrin H. Beatty, Fertilizing Nature: A Tragedy of Excess in the Commons, 9 PLoS Biology 
e1001124 (Aug. 2011). 
70
 Marc Ribaudo et al., USDA Economic Research Service, Nitrogen in Agricultural Systems: Implications for 
Conservation Policy 1 (Sept. 2011), https://perma.cc/TYD8-U5NS; see also E. Sinha et al., Eutrophication will 
increase during the 21st century as a result of precipitation changes, 357 Science 405-08 (July 2017) (describing 
how climate change will amplify the effects of reactive nitrogen pollution). 
71
 See generally United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Drawing Down Nitrous Oxide to Protect the Ozone 
Layer (2013). 
72
 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 1990-2015, at ES-3 tbl. ES-1 (2017) (listing GHGs 
and indicating global warming potentials of each relative to CO2); see also A. R. Ravishankara et al., Nitrous Oxide 
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effects are not de minimis. Excessive use of nitrogen fertilizer is a key cause of the dead zone in 
the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Mississippi River,
73
 and is responsible for roughly $1.7 
billion of the $4.8 billion spent annually on removing nitrates from drinking water supplies.
74
 
“Agricultural soils management,” which includes fertilization and manure management, 
generates 75% of the anthropogenic N2O emitted by U.S. sources.
75
 Furthermore, the greater 
intensity of precipitation attributable to climate change exacerbates the transmission of nitrogen 
from agricultural soils.
76
 Thus, as reactive nitrogen is a source of multiple forms of harmful 
pollution, improving its use efficiency (i.e., reducing instances of excessive application) on 
croplands would yield significant climate change mitigation benefits as well as public health co-
benefits, such as drinking water provision.
77
 
3.  When co-benefits are legally cognizable in the U.S. 
Though co-benefits are hugely significant to the economics and public health 
implications of climate change policy,
78
 in the U.S. they are only relevant legally if they appear 
in the following narrow set of circumstances: a legal challenge to a federal regulation adopted in 
part because of its co-benefits (or despite its co-harms).
79
 This relevance stands on two feet, one 
administrative, the other legal. The administrative foot is the Executive Order that directs 
                                                                                                                                                             
(N2O): The Dominant Ozone-Depleting Substance Emitted in the 21st Century, 326 Science 123 (2009). Notably, 
N2O is recognized as an ozone-layer-depleting gas under the Vienna Convention, but was not listed in the Montreal 
Protocol among pollutants to be phased out of use. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Annex 
I, ¶4(b)(i), Mar. 22, 1985; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987. 
73
 EPA Science Advisory Board, Reactive Nitrogen in the United States: An Analysis of Inputs, Flows, 
Consequences, and Management Options 34–35 (2011), https://perma.cc/7399-63ME. 
74
 Id. at 4. 
75
 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 1990-2015, at ES-6 tbl. ES-2 (2017). 
76
 Terrance D. Loecke et al., Weather whiplash in agricultural regions drives deterioration of water quality, 133 
Biogeochemistry 7–15 (Mar. 2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10533-017-0315-z (measuring 
increases in N resulting from rainfall made more severe by climate change). 
77
 David R. Kanter et al., Managing a forgotten greenhouse gas under existing U.S. law: An interdisciplinary 
analysis, 67 Environmental Science and Policy 44, 45 (2017); see also USDA ERS (noting that among best 
management practices available to reduce harmful effects of reactive nitrogen pollution, only improved nitrogen use 
efficiency reliably redues all adverse effects). 
78
 See Ian Parry et al., How Much Carbon Pricing Is in Countries' Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits, 
6 Climate Change Econ. 1550019 (Nov. 2015); San Francisco Department of Public Health, Assessing the Health 
Co-benefits of San Francisco’s Climate Action Plan (Aug. 2013); J. Jason West et al., Co-benefits of mitigating 
global greenhouse gas emissions for future air quality and human health, 3 Nature Climate Change 885 (2013); 
Nemet et al., supra note __, at 2–3 (noting that air quality co-benefits in particular “are large” but are, as of 2010, 
largely ignored by climate policy decisionmakers). 
79
 See Carolyn Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
575, 576 (2015) (discussing history of agency cost-benefit analysis and noting that “there must be some legal 
challenge involving the regulation and its BCA to trigger a judicial review.”). The sole exception to this statement as 
of this writing appears to be California’s law, AB 1532, adopted in 2012. California Global Warming Solutions Act 
of 2006: Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (2012). That law requires the agencies responsible for making California 
Climate Investments, (i.e., spending the revenue from the state’s greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade program), 
to maximize the co-benefits resulting from those expenditures. California Air Resources Board, Cap-and-Trade 
Auction Proceeds: Co-benefit Assessment Methods, https://perma.cc/KY8B-WRSU (last updated Oct. 27, 2017). 
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agencies to only adopt a proposed regulation after analyzing its benefits and its costs.
80
 The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has more fully prescribed how agencies 
should conduct a cost-benefit analysis, defines a co-benefit (which it calls an “ancillary benefit”) 
as “a favorable impact of the alternative under consideration [i.e., the rule,] that is typically 
unrelated or secondary to the purpose of the [rule].”
81
 OMB also makes plain that co-benefits are 
relevant to cost-benefit analysis: agencies are to “look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs 
of your rulemaking and consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks,” and 




The basic legal footing for co-benefits’ relevance is the Administrative Procedure Act, as 
interpreted by federal courts. The Act directs that agency rulemakings should reflect 
consideration of the factors contemplated by the relevant statute, and courts have read this 
direction to inform the scope of costs and benefits agencies should consider in the rulemaking 
process.
83
 Several courts have confirmed the relevance of co-benefits to rules’ administrative 
validity and legality.
84
 In U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, for instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld an EPA 
regulation after agreeing with EPA that:  
its consideration of these co-benefits [from lowering different Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(HAPs) than those primarily targeted by the proposed standard] was not a regulation of 
other pollutants; rather, it was simply choosing not to ignore the purpose of the CAA—to 
reduce the negative health and environmental effects of HAP emissions—when 
exercising its discretionary authority under the Act.
85
 
                                                 
80
 Executive Order 12,866 instructs agencies to conduct a cost benefit analysis of any significant proposed regulation 
and to adopt regulations whose societal benefits exceed their costs. Exec. Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning 
and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, (Oct. 4, 1993); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
(affirming Exec. Order No. 12,866). See also generally Maeve P. Carey, Congressional Research Service, Cost-
Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process (Dec. 2014), https://perma.cc/23YS-JXSN. 
81
 OIRA, OMB, EOB, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer 7 (Aug. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/5Z6D-FJJP. OMB 
Circular A-4, which OMB issued in 2003 to “standardiz[e] the way benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions 
are measured,” OMB Circular A-4, at 1 (2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 58366 (Oct. 9, 2003), offers an example of a valid co-
benefit: “e.g., reduced refinery emissions due to more stringent fuel economy standards for light trucks.” Id. at 26. 
82
 OMB Circular A-4, at 26.  
83
 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (“agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the 
relevant factors.’ Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43.”). 
84
 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1198–1203 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (reversing agency for quantifying only ancillary costs but not ancillary benefits); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051–52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that EPA was wrong to disregard some indirect effects of 
proposed rule), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); 
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding 
fuel economy standard on grounds that agency failed to weigh ancillary costs of lives lost because more people 
would buy and drive smaller vehicles, which are less protective in accidents). 
85
 United States Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 625 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc, 671 F. App'x 822 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), reh'g en banc in part, 671 F. App'x 824 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Mun. Power v. EPA, 
No. 16-1168, 2017 WL 1134103 (U.S. June 26, 2017). 
CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (forthcoming) 





Consistent with this reasoning, EPA has also counted as co-benefits: criteria pollutants reduced 
by the regulation of other criteria pollutants,
86




Though they have confirmed co-benefits’ administrative and legal relevance, courts have 
yet to explore the limits of that relevance.
88
 Much debate over the judicial interpretation of co-
benefits has lately focused on EPA’s decision to adopt the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard, 
which the Supreme Court remanded but did not vacate in Michigan v. EPA.
89
 EPA estimated $4 
to $6 million in benefits from the rule’s reduction of the harmful effects of mercury on the 
mental capacity of people exposed to it (“IQ points lost”), $9.6 billion in annual costs, and $37 to 
$90 billion in benefits from indirect or ancillary reductions in fine particulate matter (PM2.5).
90
 
Thus direct benefits did not outweigh costs, and roughly 90% of the benefits tallied were co-
benefits arising from effects incidental to the emissions targeted by the rule. However, because 
EPA did not rely on this calculation to justify the rule,
91
 the Court did not resolve several 
questions related to it, such as:  
 To what extent should courts defer to agency decisions about the significance of 
co-benefits to a rule’s adoption?
92
   
 Should an agency weigh co-benefits that would accrue from reductions of PM2.5 
below the level embodied in the relevant NAAQS, i.e., the level determined by 
EPA to be safe?
93
  
                                                 
86
 EPA, Final Ozone NAAQS Regulatory Impact Analysis 6-30 (Mar. 2008), https://perma.cc/443A-5M3L. 
87
 EPA, Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64679 (Oct. 23, 2015); EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule 
4-11 to 4-42 (Aug. 2015), https://perma.cc/4ETS-BFU4, (describing calculation of monetized benefits from PM2.5 
reduction and non-monetized benefits from reductions of other criteria pollutants). 
88
 See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note _, at 576–77, 592–603 (surveying cases that have addressed validity of agencies 
different approaches to cost-benefit analyses, e.g., choice of discount rate to be applied to future costs or benefits). 
89
 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (remanding but not vacating the rule). EPA announced that the rule’s 
requirements would remain in force while it revised the explanation of its legal basis pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s instructions. The D.C. Circuit rejected industry challenges to this step, White Stallion Energy Center, LLC 
v. EPA, No. 12-1100 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2015), and EPA issued that revised explanation in due course. EPA, 
Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and 
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24419 (Apr. 25, 2016). EPA’s Supplemental 
Finding was immediately challenged by the same industry coalition, and the D.C. Circuit then granted a request by 
Trump Administration’s EPA to hold the case in abeyance and to stay the rule while EPA reviewed the 2016 
Supplemental Finding. Murray Energy Corporation v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017). 
90
 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
91
 Id. at 2711. Indeed, the gravamen of the case was whether the Clean Air Act directed EPA to only consider the 
rule’s effects on health or to also consider its cost implications. 
92
 See Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1708 (2002) 
(proposing that courts develop a “common law of cost-benefit analysis” rather than ceding the whole of that analytic 
field to agencies). 
93
 EPA did so in the case of the MATS rule. See EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
from Coal and Oil Fired Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9305 (Feb. 16, 2012); EPA, 
CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (forthcoming) 




 If costs outweigh direct benefits but are outweighed by co-benefits, should the 
rule be considered beneficial?  
 
The mismatch between the practical and legal relevance of public health co-benefits to 
climate policy highlights an important gap in regulatory accounting, but one that is difficult to 
bridge. Perhaps, like the development and implementation of the Social Cost of Carbon, the 
highly technical task of articulating how best to integrate measures of co-benefits into regulatory 




B. Co-harms of mitigation 
Researchers who have examined the co-harms of mitigation in the developed world, 
including the U.S., have identified rising costs of energy and food, and employment impacts of 
the transition away from fossil-fuels as the most likely to be significant.
95
 Notably, these are all 
indirect sources of co-harms—in marked contrast to the more direct sources of co-benefits 
described above. The three examples of co-harms discussed below highlight how existing laws 
address—or fail to address—them.  
1. Biofuels production and consumption 
Biofuels are derived from plants and function as substitutes for liquid fossil fuels, chiefly 
motor fuels. In the U.S., the federal Renewable Fuel Standard—a purchasing mandate for U.S. 
motor fuel distributors—drives their production.
96
 That production has a host of adverse public 
health impacts, including air and water pollution.
97
 It also boosts food prices, with implications 
for nutrition and food security both in the U.S. and abroad.
98
 In addition, some biofuels’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 5-1 to 5-3 (Dec. 2011), 
https://perma.cc/6TD2-RDXJ (summarizing health co-benefits calculation). 
94
 Cf. National Academies of Sciences, Valuing Health for Regulatory Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (2006). 
95
 Modeling Toronto’s Low Carbon Future—Technical Paper #4: Considerations of Co-benefits and Co-harms 
Associated with Low Carbon Actions for TransformTO 39 tbl.5 (Jan. 2017) http://taf.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/170127_FINAL_Tech-Paper4_Cobenefits.pdf (higher housing costs due to density; 
employment impacts from displacement). 
96
 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140  (2007) (establishing Renewable Fuel 
Standard 2 (RFS2) for purposes that include energy security and promotion of renewable fuel sources); 40 C.F.R. pt. 
80 (codifying RFS2, which distinguishes among fuels based on their lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions levels); see 
also Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005) (establishing the initial standard, RFS1, for purpose of 
enhancing energy security). 
97
 S. Kent Hoekman et al., Environmental implications of higher ethanol production and use in the U.S.: A literature 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.050. 
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It is important to note that biofuels derived from different feed stocks—corn starch, corn 
stover (i.e., stalks and husks), sugar cane, and switch grass—differ from one another in several 
important respects, including their lifecycle GHG emissions, production costs and volumes, 
effects on markets for foodstuffs and livestock feed, and the pollution they generate.
100
 Thus 
different biofuels mitigate climate change better or worse (or not at all) and also yield greater or 
lesser public health co-harms.
101
 Ethanols derived from cornstarch generally perform worst in all 
respects, apart from being the easiest to produce cost-effectively in large volumes in the U.S.
102
  
2. Disuse of fossil fuel extraction, processing, storage, and waste sites and facilities  
Large-scale climate change mitigation means the cessation of at least some fossil fuel 
extraction, transport, refining, storage, and consumption, which in turn means the disuse of a 
host of facilities where toxic materials are processed and stored. In this way, decarbonization will 
resemble the historical shift away from other disused energy technologies, such as manufactured 
gas, which have left toxic legacies behind them.
103
 As the fact of Congress’ passage of the 
Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act (SMCRA), Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA), and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) make plain, without mandated decommissioning and remediation, disused sites and 
facilities would in most if not all cases present significant dangers to public health. Thus the 
shuttering of facilities that currently play important roles in emitting GHGs, if not followed by 
effective decommissioning and site remediation, can generate co-harms by damaging the 
surrounding environment on an ongoing basis.  
For reasons described more fully in subsection II.B.4 below, the track records for 
decommissioning and remediation by the coal mining sector (particularly in Appalachia) and 
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segments of the oil and gas sector suggest that co-harms following mitigation-driven facility 
closures are a likelihood rather than a mere possibility.  
3. Impacts transmitted by local economies and tax bases 
Mitigation policies raise the cost of doing business for firms whose profitability relies on 
it being cheap or costless to emit GHGs.
104
 If effective, such policies have net positive effects on 
public health,
105
 but could have net-positive, neutral, or net-negative effects on employment and 
the economy.
106
 Whatever their valence in the aggregate, positive and negative economic effects 
will not be distributed evenly; some localities will lose.
107
 It follows that the public health 
impacts of raising costs—in some cases prohibitively—on firms with significant exposure to 
mitigation policies in a given locality, will be mixed and complex. On the one hand, extractive 
industries, power plants, and high-emitting industrial facilities pollute their surroundings, and 
some of the jobs they support are unhealthy for the workers doing them.
108
 On the other hand, 
unemployment in the U.S. has been shown to harm public health by leading to higher rates of 
smoking and drinking,
109






 and all-cause 
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 Importantly, the mechanisms that would link these results to mitigation policies are 
complex, difficult to parse, and often involve not just downsizing employers but also community 
institutions confronted with falling local spending and taxes (severance, sales, and property).
114
 
4. Existing legal responses to co-harms 
As explained below, existing legal responses to the co-harms described above suffer from 
important shortcomings.   
Biofuels. Various laws address some—but only some—of the co-harms of biofuels’ 
production and consumption. Air and water pollution control laws treat the farming and 
processing of biofuels much like other forms of farming and feedstock processing, requiring that 
qualifying facilities receive permits to operate and abide by those permits’ requirements.
115
 Of 
course, these laws’ treatment of agricultural activities is notoriously permissive,
116
 and biofuels 
production and processing fit within many of the same carve-outs that account for that 
permissiveness. Similarly, the 2017–2025 Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards that 
govern emissions from passenger vehicles do not make any special provision to address harms 
arising from ethanol as opposed to standard gasoline.
117
 The legislation imposing the Renewable 
Fuel Standard on fuel distributors does not expressly contemplate co-harms, much less address 
them, whether they result from pollution, land use changes, or upward pressure on food prices.
118
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Remediation. Several laws—chiefly SMCRA, RCRA, and CERCLA—direct firms to 
conduct decommissioning and remediation of fossil fuel-related facilities and sites, provide 
agencies and citizens with causes of action against instances of harmful nonfeasance, and make 
state and federal agencies a partial backstop to nonfeasance. Thus coal mines, gas and oil wells, 
pipelines, oil refineries, and even gas stations, among other things, cannot simply be abandoned, 
but must be dealt with in a way that protects public health by preventing the release of any toxic 
substances onsite and in some instances restoring their location to something like its original 
state.
119
 However, even though these laws provide for minimal amounts of bonding (i.e., the 
setting aside of funds) or retroactive liability to incentivize thorough cleanup of a site, 
underinvestment in decommissioning and site remediation is endemic in segments of the energy 
sector.
120
 In relation to coal, this seems to owe to financial pressure on mining operations in the 
eastern U.S.,
121
 and to the unwillingness of state governments and the federal Office of Surface 
Mining and Reclamation Enforcement to compel more aggressive saving for remediation.
122
 In 
the production and distribution portions of oil and gas sector, the story is similar in some 
ways,
123
 but different in others. While adequate maintenance of a facility or drilling site with 
healthy financial prospects is a sound investment for a well-capitalized company, such 
companies often sell when facilities’ profitability begins to fade—and generally sell to less well-
capitalized buyers with incentives to wring out whatever profitability remains. This wringing out 
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Mitigation can be expected to increase the number of facilities implicated by these laws, 
which provide fragmentary coverage,
125
 and are often too weak or too easily avoided to ensure 
adequate investment or action on the part of private parties.
126
 Furthermore, the agencies that are 
meant to provide a backstop are often overwhelmed and unable to make up for private 
nonfeasance.
127
 Thus the environmental and public health consequences of underfunded 
decommissioning and remediation represent externalities that existing law and policy have failed 
to price into the cost of doing business in the fossil fuel industry. 
Local economic impacts. Existing legal responses to this category of co-harms all fit into 
the category of programs devised to support a “just transition”
128
—a term coined by unions in 
the 1980s and applied since to various policy-driven displacements of industry, whether rooted in 
trade, environmental protection, or something else.
129
 These responses tend to be ad hoc, 
temporary, and reflective of the political circumstances that prevailed at the time of their 
formulation. 
One fairly recent example of a federal response to regional economic impacts that were 
not driven by mitigation policies, but by policies that resemble mitigation policies, is the Secure 
Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS Act).
130
 The SRS Act 
addressed the economic impacts of the timber industry’s decline in localities that, because of 
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their location on or near federal lands, were prohibited from using taxation to raise revenues.
131
 
Since 1908, they relied instead on a portion of the receipts from federal timber leases—revenues 
that fell alongside timber sales in the 1990s when the industry shrank and in some places 
collapsed.
132
 The SRS Act originally scheduled its last payments for FY 2006, but that end date 
was extended a further seven years through several reauthorizations.
133
 An earlier example, the 
Clean Air Employment Transition Assistance Program, was enacted as part of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 with the express purpose of ameliorating those Amendments’ impacts on 
employment in affected sectors.
134
 Both of these were straightforward in their logic and focused 
in their aims: federal money would, for a limited period, offset local economic impacts that 
federal policy had created in whole or in part by. 
A more recent example of a federal transition program included two components: the 
POWER (Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization) Initiative, 
launched in 2015, and the Assistance for Coal Communities (ACC) 2017 program (collectively, 
the Initiative). Legal authority for the Initiative roots primarily in the 1965 law, amended in 
1975, 1998, and 2002, that established the Appalachian Development Commission,
135
 but it 
draws from a variety of sources with diverse statutory bases for funding,
136
 and directs that 
funding to the support of diverse activities.
137
 In contrast to the SRS Act and Clean Air 
Employment Transition Program, the Initiative was not conceived of or codified by Congress, 
but by the Obama Administration to address existing consequences of coal communities’ 
decline.
138
 It was intended to address anticipated consequences—actual or perceived—of the 
Clean Power Plan,
139
 whose opponents framed it as the latest attack in the “war on coal,” and one 
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that could cause the Appalachian coal supply chain to collapse.
140
 Thus the Initiative was, 
arguably, the first example of a deliberate (if not explicit) federal response to co-harms of 
climate change mitigation policy in the U.S.  
 
III. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are ambitious. That ambition should not mark them as 
“academic” (i.e., logically sound but actually infeasible). Rather, it should highlight the large 
size of the gap that separates our current legal regime from one that would translate current 
scientific understanding of climate change and public health outcomes into limitations on 
polluting activity and the prudent selection and calibration of climate change mitigation 
measures.   
Adopt legislation clarifying the relevance of climate change to permits issued under 
environmental laws. Debates over whether and how Congress should address climate change 
have focused almost exclusively on mitigation measures that would address GHG emissions; 
adaptation has largely been ignored. As described above, patterns of enforcement of 
environmental laws will signal that the climate is changing and that adaptation is necessary to 
protect public health, but that signal is likely to be compromised and also accompanied by a 
great deal of noise. Congress should ensure that the signal is unmistakeably clear. It can do so by 
amending key provisions of several statutes—at a minimum, RCRA, CERCLA, and the Clean 
Water Act—to condition permitting, whether for facilities or whole states, on the conduct of a 
climate change vulnerability assessment within the past five to 10 years and demonstrated efforts 
to address any significant vulnerabilities it identifies. For coastal facilities, key vulnerabilities 
would presumably arise from storms and flooding; for, say statewide water pollution permits 
under the Clean Water Act, they could arise equally from risks of drought or extreme 
precipitation. 
Fund a study to develop recommendations for the analysis of ancillary effects of 
regulations with an eye to potential judicial review. Much divides the disparate views of those 
who dispute how agencies should assess co-benefits and co-harms of a proposed regulation—and 
how courts should review an agency’s assessment. Because these issues are both important and 
contested, it would be valuable to develop basic points of agreement and to articulate points of 
disagreement with precision so that further research is more likely to resolve them. The National 
Academies of Sciences and the U.S. Judicial Conference are both potential sources of neutral 
expertise that could contribute authors and editors to such an effort. 
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Compel insurance coverage for community public health impacts as well as bonding for 
site remediation. Planning and prudent investment can avoid many of the public health co-harms 
that arise from economic transition. Many of those co-harms are avoidable through anticipatory 
bonding or investment. Firms that are responsible for facilities/sites that will require 
decommissioning/remediation should prevent local communities from enduring the public health 
impacts that would arise directly from their abandonment. In addition to bonding requirements, 
therefore, firms should also be required to carry an insurance policy against direct adverse public 
health impacts of potential abandonment (i.e., not including indirect effects like unemployment 
or economic straits). The premiums charged for the policy would reflect the insurer’s assessment 
of the adequacy of money set aside for bonding—adequate bonding would mean a nominal 
premium, inadequate bonding a potentially enormous premium. 
Conclusion 
Existing environmental laws are not well suited to addressing the public health impacts of 
climate change or the impacts of efforts to mitigate it. As this chapter has explained, even laws 
that make public health their lodestar cannot be expected to reveal fully the costs of climate 
change or to compel action that effectively addresses or avoids those costs. With respect to 
mitigation, existing law has thus far failed to take account of the public health impacts of several 
sources of GHG emissions, and is unlikely to anticipate or avert the impacts of mitigating those 
emissions. This bleak assessment is the basis for several ambitious recommendations that would 
not provide complete solutions to the problems identified herein, but would provide important 
foundations on which to build toward effective solutions.  
